


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Whither Sovereignty

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WHITHER SOVEREIGNTY?

"Any system of government, upon the modern scale, involves a body of experts working to satisfy vast populations who judge by the result and are careless of, even uninterested in, the processes by which those results are attained."

Harold J. Laski

by

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WHITHER SOVEREIGNTY

by

**Colonel Michael A. Wansink
Canadian Forces**

ABSTRACT

The paper examines the evolution of sovereignty from the time of its initial concept in the sixteenth century and challenges some of the assumptions about the identifiable elements of the notion. Whereas, the original and more classical interpretation was one of legal and moral spheres to serve the needs of a territorially specific populous, the nature of sovereignty has been influenced by the evolution of social dynamics, increasingly global economics, accelerating technological change and shifting cultural (as opposed to national) affiliations. The effect of these influences questions the utility of sovereignty to serve the needs and aspirations of the people in various societies.

A hypothesis based on a synthesis of studies of organizational innovation and cultural groupings is made which links today's pertinence of the concept of sovereignty to First, Second and Third Wave societies and their respective abilities to adjust to the realities of the new world order.

INTRODUCTION

In my original consideration of this paper, I had remarked upon the development and composition of the American Declaration of Independence and the US Constitution and reflected upon the philosophical thoughts of their framers. In their suspicious judgement of the sovereign power of the king of England, they developed a constitution that would divide the power in such a way as to make it impossible for any single person or entity within the triumvirate of federal power to dominate or oppress the people they represented. Furthermore, it struck me as quite remarkable that in agreeing to the Constitution, the individual states recognized that in sacrificing their own jurisdiction and power they gained the strength and benefits of the larger whole. In giving up some of their jurisdiction and power they allowed the federal power to assume some of the states' sovereign powers. My idealist sentiments caused me to wonder further, that if the example of the US Constitution had succeeded so remarkably well in serving the inalienable rights of its citizens by the submission of state sovereignties into the larger whole, could the submission of modern day state (national) sovereignties into a larger federation of states realistically serve world order and peaceful coexistence?

While the answer to such an esoteric question would be much beyond the scope of a paper of restricted length, it did cue me to the exploration of the evolution of the notion of sovereignty. Indeed, when the leaders of a nation develop their nation's grand strategy they first identify their national interests. Primary amongst those interests to be protected is the nation's sovereignty. It is therefore essential that we fully understand what is meant

or could be meant by sovereignty before we draw lines in the sand to protect it or close our minds to its insolubility.

The paper will trace the evolution of the notion of sovereignty and further examine and challenge some of the assumptions about the identifiable elements of sovereignty that can or should be protected in a changing relationship between nations of a modern, shrinking world. With an understanding of changing nature of sovereignty, national leaders who develop their nations' security strategy will have the opportunity to consider different perspectives of what can and should be protected.

DISCUSSION

The term "sovereignty" has only come into usage within the last four centuries, yet the understanding of its meaning and hence, the sense and purpose for which the term is used has changed quite markedly. On two sample days, for example, a keyword access to Internet news articles found no less than six items that referred to sovereignty in some form². Some interpret its usage in the classical sense and other usages provide a much wider or narrower understanding of the term.

The Birth of Sovereignty

In its historical evolution, the term "sovereignty" grew with the concept of the nation state. The territorial nation state is the product of the religious battles of the sixteenth century. Prior to that time, Western civilization was seen as a single commonwealth in which sovereignty did not exist. Power was embodied in the religious,

moral right of the Pope and military right of the Emperor, and the community was a maze of small kingdoms, principalities, duchies³ etc, each with its overlapping loyalties, allegiances and legal jurisdictions⁴. However, the Church was the only moral authority. The powers of the Pope and Emperor ultimately clashed in the demands for reform, lead by Luther⁵, who contested the abuses of the Church. Refused the papal reforms he wanted, Luther sought support from some of the princes to assert their power of the state in executing those reforms. Furthermore, the decline of the feudal order was also being fueled by the growth of trade and the manufacturing classes, the enforcement of monarchical law, the development of central institutions, the hiring of armies and the introduction of royal taxes. From Toffler's perspective⁶, this was a period of transformation from the First Wave to the Second Wave and it was coincident with power increasingly being centralized in the monarchies. Insistence upon their sovereignty and the unified allegiance it implied, aided Luther's case against the Pope and strengthened identification of the state in the prince and the identification of power with the monarchy. "What the prince willed was right because it was his will. Right ceased to mean, as in the Middle Ages, a particular aspect of universal justice; it came to mean that which emanates from a single center in the body politic and by its predominating unity gives strength and decisiveness to the striking power of the community."⁷

The assertion of sovereignty was intended to renew the prosperity that religious conflict had disrupted and to vindicate the supremacy of the secular order over religious power. As a demonstration of that supremacy, it was argued by the political philosophers

like Bodin, Hobbes and Rousseau, that every organized political community must have a definite political authority if the State is to exist. That political authority must not only itself be obeyed, but also be itself beyond the reach of authority. For them, power of the political authority had to be unimpeachable in order for it to be able to assert its legal authority and demands for allegiance. Moreover, until the demise of the Holy Roman Empire at the close of the sixteenth century, it was difficult for the state to exert the moral authority that was implied by its legal authority. However, the Renaissance of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries which had given birth to new political, literary and scientific thought brought challenges the longstanding doctrines of the church which undermined the papal authority, including its moral authority. Once religious difference was permanently recognized with the Reformation in the sixteenth century, the territorially bound State became the sole body with which the citizenship could make a common association of law. Furthermore, in the transformation of the feudal kingdom to one of absolute sovereignty, the king acquired the right to "own" his territory and be the sole authority to legislate, execute and arbitrate the state's laws.

As the various sovereign royal estates evolved in Europe during the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, it became necessary to recognize formally, the boundaries of the authority of each independent state. Regardless of the correctness of the historical argument that it was the Peace of Ausburg (1555) or the Treaty of Westphalia that marked the beginning of the notion of sovereignty, it was the latter event in 1648 that brought the religious wars to an end and formally recognized the independence of states to make their

own laws. Furthermore, it established the rules of conduct between states including agreement on the territorial boundaries of each state.

It is meaningful to also recognize the distinct difference in the sovereign concept that was stimulated by the writings of such absolutist philosophers as Machiavelli⁸, Bodin⁹ and Hobbes¹⁰ and the more pluralistic interpretations of Locke¹¹, Rousseau¹² and Kant¹³ and expressed in events such as the American and French Revolutions (1776 and 1792 respectively). Prior to these two events, power rested in the sovereign himself. But the growth of independence in individual thought and reaction to the abuses of the sovereign power created fertile ground in some states for wresting the sovereign authority from the monarchy and giving it to the people. Thus, sovereignty grew gradually in specific countries, to derive its meaning in the pluralistic power of the people of the state rather than in that of the monarchy. Similarly, various states over history have shifted from variations in absolute to limited monarchical power, from representative to limited pluralistic power or variations in dictatorial power. The philosophical contest as to whether sovereignty represents supreme or limited coercive power attributed to some unidentifiable element of the state or whether it represents specific constitutionally recognizable democratic arrangement is now three centuries old. Marx, however, contributed meaningfully to the argument in underlining the difference between the philosophical theory of sovereignty and its more practical political and economical reality. To his view, in capitalist societies, the representation of the state as the protector of the sovereign interest of society is largely illusory in that the moral reality it protects is that of the property

owner and the unlimited development of the bourgeois society and free movement of private interests¹⁴. Whether or not his perceptions are accurate, it does emphasize that meaning of sovereignty is a function of perceptions and expectations of different societies and elements of society. Moreover, his insights recognize the economic underpinnings of the concept¹⁵. Societies look to the state to protect their property and provide the climate for their economic security. Although there is a difference between communism and capitalism as to how economic security is distributed, both provide an economic expectation.

Nationhood and Identity

The notion of sovereignty and nationhood are nearly used interchangeably. In the sense of nation, there is an interpretation of bonding of a community of common interests and vision, which is different from that of other communities and other nations. That sense of community has had exceptional power and is sufficiently strong at times to compel populations to fight and die for its protection or expansion. The source of that power has varied between states and as we shall discuss later, may transcend specific territorial borders. In most modern "self-determined" democracies, the sense of community has been derived from the free desire, the historically common struggle, common aspirations or cultural linguistic traditions of the people within such democratic nations¹⁶. In authoritarian states, it was often artificially created by the political inspiration, control or coercion of the leadership, bureaucracy and elite classes of the state. Often, the minority cultures were forced into conformity in order to forge a homogeneity of cultural identification with the state¹⁷. The control of information, education and the press and the suppression of

divergent thought, or even outright annihilation of minority cultures¹⁸ in more authoritarian states is often required to create their sense of community, and the peoples' allegiance to the nation was engineered by powerful coercion. In the pluralistic democratic state, there has been a vertical vision of community through time in which there is some deep rooted rhetoric of nationalism and thus a common interest in the sovereignty of the territorially bound state. In the autocratic state, there is often but not always, a sense of artificiality of nation created by coercion or conquest. In these states, the sense of community can therefore be horizontally shallow and disguise greater attractions of community with other groupings either internally or externally to the sovereign state.

It is pertinent as well, to briefly review how the concept of sovereignty evolved outside sixteenth and seventeenth century Europe. The notion of sovereignty was not a historically meaningful concept in other parts of the world. It meant (and may still mean) little to the tribal communities of Africa which are organized primarily around ties of lineage and kinship¹⁹. The fluid relationship between the monarchies who occupied the seat of the "Son of Heaven" from the Han dynasty of the third century, to the Yuan dynasty of the early twentieth century and feudal lords of ancient China, the organization of the territorially rivalrous tribal groupings in South America or the hegemonic principles upon which the Egyptian and Persian Empires were based did not define equal and contending sovereignties²⁰. The development of territorial sovereignty in other parts of the world was simply a product of its exportation by the imperial powers of Europe in their colonial discoveries, conquests and victories from the seventeenth to twentieth centuries. Moreover,

the specific division of territories by these European powers was often arbitrary and ignored national or cultural aspirations of the peoples affected by these territorial divisions or their previously established organizations of community²¹ .

What is important to acknowledge is that in some states, the notion of sovereignty was not an evolutionary process as it was in most European societies but more a legal condition thrust upon them, notwithstanding that their more recent release from colonial bondage has given them a sense of evolutionary validity. Thus, these states have a different historical and political-cultural sense of sovereignty than do most Western societies and a correspondingly shallow bond of national community. However, once formed, these states were required to conform to the various sovereign conventions established predominantly by European societies and expressed in International Law written by those European societies. That they now have voice in the creation and interpretation of International Law however, contributes in some degree to present day perceptions of their sovereign legitimacy.

International Law

If the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648 established the basic rules of conduct between states, there have literally been thousands of treaties and international agreements made to govern the relationships between states since the end of the seventeenth century. Various international judiciary bodies have been created to develop international laws and to resolve disputes between states. Similarly, other international institutions have been created to

promote cooperation between states or assist in their development. While sovereign states agreed to these conventions and agreements, history has been marked by hundreds of conflicts arising from violations and disagreement about the interpretation of these laws. That they have no authority nor body of enforcement underscores their voluntary nature and in the view of modern realists, their disutility. As observed by Charles W. Kegley in his article *The Neoidealist Movement in International Studies*²², the theoretical utility of International Law has been a subject of political study and discourse after nearly every major conflict. On one side of the argument have been the realists such as Thucydides, Machiavelli, Clausewitz and Morgenthau and the other the idealists such as Hugo Grotius, Immanuel Kant and Woodrow Wilson. Realists would cite the cause of failure of the League of Nations as the prevalence of the divergent national interests of the great powers²³ over that of international authority, or the nugatory effect to compliance with international law during the Cold War, inherent with the veto power of the permanent members of the Security Council under Chapter VII of the UN Charter . To the realists, international politics is power politics and might is right. If war and conflict are to be avoided, it is only by maintaining a balance of power.

Idealists, on the other hand, would point to the birth of America and the triumph of agreement between states to subsume their sovereignties into an idealist Constitution, or the surrender of colonial rule by imperial powers, the numerous successful voluntary compliances with the judgements of the international courts, world standardization agreements in maritime shipping, aircraft operations, ecological and fisheries protection

zones etc. In the paradigm shift of world order in the 1990s, the trumpet of the neoidealists sounds the successes of world-wide cooperation against the aggression of Iraq in Kuwait, the solicitation of accord in the UN by President Clinton for occupation of Haiti as a legitimate prerequisite to seeking agreement from his own nation. Another neon light of the neoidealists is the example of the "pooled sovereignty"²⁴ of the European Union in which a voluntary union has been created without any consideration of an "internal security" force to ensure compliance. To the idealists, the only hope for civilization lies in cooperation and shared power between nations.

While both camps have valid examples to reinforce their points, historical scorecards are not sufficient to be able to predict the future. The tremendous changes in the world since the end of the Cold War is testament to its unpredictability. At best, we can only look at the trends of today to take a reasonable guess at what will happen tomorrow. Let us then examine sovereignty as it is viewed and played today.

Today's Interpretations of Sovereignty

The fact that the word sovereignty is used in so many different contexts today is a demonstration of not only the evolution of the notion but also to some degree an incomplete understanding by those who use it, of its underlying meaning. Indeed, the Oxford dictionary defines it simply as, "supreme power and exempt from external control". When we talk about sovereignty today, what we are dealing with is power; but what is important in the nature of power is the end it seeks to serve and the way in which it serves

that end. These are the key questions and they are both questions which are related to, but independent of specific legal rights. Realists such as Morgenthau would argue that in the legal sense, sovereign power is indivisible or it would no longer be supreme or sovereign²⁵. But his is an ontological argument that ignores the ends which the power serves. Even using his argumentation, the government of a democratic nation, elected by the people is not the supreme power because the people have the legal right to dismiss it. "Supreme" power is a temporary privilege of the governors acting at the pleasure of the people it is elected to serve. Pragmatic emphasis is placed on the purpose of that power being to serve the people. While it could be argued that democratically elected powers are not always permitted to assume power because of restrictions imposed by military juntas or the like, by the very denial of democratic practices, such nations are not democratic. Even in states under authoritarian rule, the supreme authority attempts to serve the best interests of the people and if he abuses it or fails, he is subject to overthrow by revolution, coup, insurrection, revolt or rebellion²⁶.

As we have seen, historically, there is no limit to the variety of ways in which power may be organized. The sovereign state, historically, is merely one of the ways, an incident in its evolution, the continued utility of which may well be in question. It is also valuable to examine what distinguishes one state from another other than its territorial location, to determine what the elements of that power are and where they are distributed. Harold J. Laski, one of the twentieth century's oft quoted political writers suggested that the "sense of purpose embodied in the state is that it is an organization for the enabling the mass of

men to realize social good on the largest possible scale...promoting certain uniformities of conduct... to control, shape or form those obvious commodities on which the welfare of its members depends... We obey the state because in the end it most truly represents ourselves...the state is thus the universal in which each of us as particulars find our meaning. It becomes ourselves as it seeks to give expression to our wants and desires." When he wrote this in 1925, he was probably correct, as people identified themselves with the state because the state served their needs and provided their identities. My continued analysis will look at whether the state continues to be the sole or appropriate source of peoples' expectation, identity or satisfaction, to what degree states continue to exert power free from external control²⁷ or whether the notion of sovereignty is going through a new evolution in serving the needs of populace of the state. As well, if the Renaissance created in western societies a new awareness of themselves and of their powers, we will explore whether the New Renaissance and the New World Order is ushering in another level of awareness of self and power and whether there is a new reality or ideal that will provide for peoples' needs.

The reader will recall that the Renaissance was fueled by the growth of trade and the emergence of the manufacturing classes and marked the transition from the agrarian feudal order in Europe to the industrialization and urbanization of society. This was the transformation from the First Wave to the Second Wave. Postmodernists suggest the sun is setting on the Second Wave, and the Third Wave is dawning; the industrialized world is in transition from the Industrial Age to the Information Age and a chaotic age of

change²⁸. If the purpose for the sovereign state, in the Industrial Age that spawned it, was to centralize power in order provide the protection and opportunity for prosperity, who has what power in the Information Age, what end does that power seek to serve and how does it serve it?

Economics as an International Force

A common theme in discussions of national security today is that economic security is the cornerstone to national security. It is not a new idea. Merchantalists from the sixteenth to the eighteenth centuries implored the state's intervention in the economy to ensure commercial, financial and military strength.²⁹ Neomerchantalists and realists think no less of the importance of wealth, industrial power and a strong economy in the maintenance of the national security although their focus is more to ensure that these resources are available to the mobilization of military power when required³⁰. In the liberalist view, a strong economy is even more important because free flowing uncontrolled international division of labor and expansion of trade promotes world prosperity: "Internationally, as commercial and financial flows become global, economic incentives to engage in hostilities will be reduced, paving the way for a peaceful world order."³¹ In terms of the cohesion of any particular nation, prosperity is a strong glue. Prosperous populations will not likely be sufficiently dissatisfied to challenge the authority and power of the state from within, if the state has created (or does not inhibit) the conditions which generated their prosperity³². On the other hand, people in poor nations are more likely to challenge the authority of the state if it has not satisfied their aspirations for physical and economic

security. In the psychological terms of Maslow's hierarchy of needs³³, the sense of belonging is a higher level need to sustenance populations and sustenance populations are therefore more likely to have a lower sense of national community than Outer-directed or Inner directed populations.

At Annex A is a summary of Maslow's Hierarchy of Needs and a chart developed by Dutch anthropologist Geert Hofstede which differentiates 50 countries employing four different cultural dimensions: Power Distance Index (PDI), Individualism (IDV), Masculinity Index (MAS) and Uncertainty Avoidance Index (UAI). For purposes of simplicity, the chart entitled European Cultural Map at Annex A is divided down a Maternalism and Individualism axis. Those in the North East quadrant are both "individualistic" and "caring"; those in the South East, "individualistic" and more inclined to "take care of themselves" etc. One can readily recognise that the more developed and industrialized nations tend to be individualistic and one would associate these nations being at levels of development somewhat beyond the sustenance level³⁴. Predominantly Inner-directed populations who are well beyond the sustenance or esteem requirements look upon the state for much less maternalistic support to satisfy their aspirations. In the new world order, the power of nations is largely centered in their economic power, particularly in its ability to satisfy the aspirations of their populations. Is that power still germane to the nations with advanced populations and and if it is, who holds that power?

Few nations can be economically powerful without international trade. Britain, once the world's dominant power, gained its economic wealth as the world's premiere trading nation. Similarly, Japan and the USA³⁵ have enjoyed their wealth since the mid-20th century mainly as a result of their growing international trade. Small nations like Singapore and Hong Kong owe their economic prosperity to their successes in international trade and the oil rich Gulf States would be nothing if they were not able to export their tremendous hydrocarbon resources. What is a remarkable reflection of trade over the last forty years is the impact of the Transnational Corporation (TNC) as one of its agents. In 1960, the international movement of goods by the top 200 global industrial corporations accounted for 17.7 percent of GNP in the non-planned economies. Their share increased to 28.6 percent by 1980³⁶ and 40 percent of world trade is now a product of the movement of goods and services within the same companies³⁷. Similarly, foreign investment has grown markedly, where global foreign investment between nations was \$419.5 billion in 1992³⁸ or about four times the book value of all foreign investment in 1967³⁹. It is easy to recall as well, the concern expressed by Americans in the 1970s and 1980s about the influx of foreign investment in this country and the transfer of some long-standing national corporate symbols to the ownership of foreigners.⁴⁰ With the growth of these TNCs and their proportion of world trade, national authorities have a decreasing amount of control and power over their economies. Moreover, the less expensive labor forces in Third World countries upon whom a number of these TNCs depend could develop a greater allegiance and sense of belonging to the company than to the nation. Indeed, their migration has helped stabilize the economies in several third world countries as migrant workers in OPEC

countries originating from such nations as India, Pakistan, Sri Lanka and the Philippines recycle petrodollars. Illegal immigration to California from Mexico, while a concern to American immigration authorities, is another illustration of the power of economic prosperity as a motivator over that of nationality. Similarly, TNCs have developed industrial bases in Third World countries as third and fourth tier suppliers to high technology industries in the industrialized world and these technologies are increasingly interdependent on a global scale⁴¹. Increasingly, the source of economic power in these countries lies outside their sovereign borders. In reference to Maslow's hierarchy of needs, the TNCs are providing for the subsistence and the belonging needs to as much or greater extent than are the national sovereign governments. To some degree the sense of community for some of the people in these companies transcends any national border or identity. It should be acknowledged that this may not be true for closed economies of radically left nationalist nations who see foreign investment and trade as neocolonialism and foreign dependence and control. These nations, while wishing to industrialize, will remain predominantly agrarian until some degree of social, political or economic integration occurs with the outside world⁴².

The outside impact on a sovereign nation's economy is not limited to that of the TNCs. In the Information Age, where money and investment can move globally literally at the speed of light, over a trillion dollars is traded daily by currency speculators. Small tremors or rumors can change the value of a national currency faster than national monetary authorities can put protective measures in place. Poignant recent examples are

that of Mexico and Russia which lost half the value of their currencies and hence its buying power in a matter of six weeks⁴³. Financial transactions in the international currency markets have exceeded the capacity of national governments or international agencies to regulate it.

This phenomenon is closely related the nature of international borrowing and the volatility of debt repayment capabilities of many nations. It also illustrates the degree to which nations' economies are progressively more at the mercy of powers outside their borders . Increasingly, the source of credit is not from foreign governments but rather it is securitized on the open international financial markets and controlled by portfolio managers of large international mutual funds. These managers have their interests in protecting investors' resources and can shift exceptionally large sums of money out of short term securities very rapidly as was recently witnessed in Mexico leaving the securitized country with insufficient credit to pay its loans. Alternately, nations can solicit direct foreign loans from other nations. On the side of the borrower, specific conditions often accompany the loan, which infringes upon the sovereign capabilities of the state to make its own policies and laws. During the recent debate on the provision of \$40B in loan guarantees to the Mexican government for example, Senator Phil Gramm insisted that he would oppose any such loan unless there was a provision for Mexico to create its own version of an independent Federal Reserve Bank⁴⁴. Other conditional measures invoked by President Clinton include certain levels of US oversight of Mexico's economic planning, the establishment of very high interest rates and boosting of the salaries of its lowest paid

workers⁴⁵. To a large degree, the internal political power to control the economy of Mexico has been severely eroded. This would have resembled the erosion of the political and economic power in Bolivia by conditions attached to the US financial assistance in 1962-63⁴⁶.

Realists would argue that states are never free of other's influence and this does not infringe upon their sovereignty because they retain their sovereignty in having the free choice to seek others' assistance⁴⁷. In such cases as the Mexican loan or the American intervention in the Bolivian political process in 1962 however, neither the Bolivians or the Mexicans necessarily had the freedom to develop their own strategies and the sheer size of the Mexican loan guarantee effectively places Mexico in the receivership of the lenders. Similarly, because of defaults on some international loans in the 1980s such as those in Brazil, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) embarked on a policy of damage limitation in their loans to developing countries which included conditions to the granting of loans such devaluation of currency, cut backs in social programs, privatization, higher taxes⁴⁸. In turn the economic hardship often creates internal political and social discontent in the countries involved and serves to illustrate the extent to which the growth of debt can constrain both the political, economic and social policy options of the indigenous national power.

External influence, while not necessarily as eroding of national power, is as prevalent in strong economies as weak ones. The Group of Seven confers on each other to raise or lower interest rates, increase or decrease the money supply or open or limit trade in specific

markets. The fact that nations with the strong economies, private banking organizations and large investment companies based in these countries lend vast quantities of money to weaker nations exposes the stronger as well, to the potential of defaults. The stock market prices of many bank shares shifted markedly during various debt crises of borrowing nations in the 1980s, and currency values of lender nations were correspondingly subject to international financial market vicissitudes as a result. This induced lender nations to invoke measures to protect their currencies. Similarly, protection of the economic security of a trading partner serves the interests of both parties. For example, during the recent Mexican currency crisis, there were some 700,000 American jobs related to Mexican trade at stake. As much as some may think the USA or the IMF should not have provided the loan guarantees, to do so would have imposed significant socioeconomic disruption in the US. This serves to illustrate that power over the prosperity of nations is increasingly interdependent and decentralized and that the lines between domestic and foreign policy are becoming less clear⁴⁹. This is in contrast to centralizing purposes for which nation states were established in the seventeenth century.

Territoriality

Short of war, it is commonly perceived that one area of consistency in the concept of sovereignty is the territorial ownership of the nation. The emergence of the nation state in the 16th Century implied a territorially bound state in which its geographic integrity was inviolate. There was an implicit understanding that other nations had no claim to ownership of its land or resources. This has grown through various international agreements to include

territorial seas in the form of economic, ecological and fisheries protection zones as well as the airspace over sovereign states. As we have already discussed above however, the ownership of property whether it be land, resources or industrial capability, has become increasingly global. Because in most cases, international owners own such resources at the pleasure of the host nation, they must conform to the legal conventions and respect the sovereign authority of the host nations in the ownership⁵⁰ for exploitation of these properties and it could be said that the legal authorities still exercise sovereignty over their territory. That is not to say however, that their laws and policies are not influenced to some degree by foreign ownership. When foreign firms for example, develop employment opportunities for indigenous segments of the population, a certain level of dependency by the host nation is established. Should internal legal or policy conditions impinge upon the foreign owner's interests, the foreign owners' implied or real threat of closure of the source of employment can influence application of the government policy. Whereas the government need not comply with the foreign owner, it may in some circumstances, spite the purposes of its power (that of providing for the security and property of its people) in so doing⁵¹. This type of coercive leverage can impose itself upon the freedom of action of the host power.

Similarly, regional defensive alliances, such as NATO and the Warsaw Pact, stationed foreign troops on the soils of many European Nations. The foreign troops in those nations did not necessarily come under the command authority of the host nation and their military action in times of conflict may well have been counter to the common will of the people in those nations. The US retention of nuclear release decisions for example was

conceded by the host government as a conditionality to US defense commitment. The decision for the actual use of those weapons in wartime did not therefore require the consent of the host nation although it certainly could have had either a positive or negative impact on the welfare of the people⁵². In a manner, defensive alliances are often a surrender of some level of sovereignty and more often than not it is the dominant partner in the alliance that sets the policy⁵³.

Ecological Challenges

The temporal sense of sovereignty implies not only that the state controls what is presently happening within its sovereign sphere but also controls the future welfare of its inhabitants. It is in this sense that the state's control over its coastal economic and ecological zones and the internal ecology have particular significance. Control of the territory by sovereign nations can be significantly influenced by the action of others without any penetration of the territory by an external political or military power but more as a product of our existence in an ecological biosphere where the forces of nature and the free movement of air and water are the agents of invasion. Moreover, the control of the ecological environment is often beyond the sovereign domain. Numerous examples come readily to mind such as the effects of acid rain, the thinning of the ozone layer, global warming, nuclear accidents and ocean pollution, all of which affect more than the nations responsible for its generation. The pollution of one nation may not only damage the ecology of another but impart an economical and sociological impact beyond the level of the sovereign government to control. For example, the overfishing off the east coast of North

America by international fishing fleets has depleted the fish stocks to unrecoverable levels. Despite recognition of the trend in the 1970s, and various International agreements on quotas within the 200 mile economic and fisheries protection zone, fish stocks continued to decline to the point where one of the primary economic activities in Canada's maritime provinces is now destitute, inducing the Canadian government to establish expensive social programs to relocate, compensate or retrain those formerly in the fishing industry. The diverted opportunities arising from the cost of this program affects the welfare of the entire country.

What it calls into question is the practical utility in the construct of sovereignty to address these kinds of problems. Continued national level focus on international ecological concerns that have a transborder or global impact result in either a continued frustration and tension between nations in addressing the problems or a calling to new level cooperation or authority to address the future needs of national and international societies.

New Sociological and Cultural Realities.

It was formerly noted that political philosophers argued that every organized political community looks to the state for the provision of the common good and we obey the rules it makes to govern our conduct because it represents ourselves and our meaning. In the seventeenth to twentieth century industrial society, it was considerably easier than today for the state to influence our allegiances, aspirations and identities because of the limited information available either through design⁵⁴ or because of the less developed

information transmission mechanisms available. Because the cultural identity provides one of the rationalizations for the existence of the state, various states create mechanisms to protect the cultural identity⁵⁵. Iran regulates the transmission of radio and television, the NAFTA agreement excludes free trade in the cultural industries, North Korea outlaws certain cultural media in order for the state to retain its cultural legitimacy. However, with the advent of the communications revolution and the exponential growth of communication technologies, as well as various instruments of the mass media such as satellites and television or cultural vehicles such as music, radio and movies, there are few sections of the globe immune to alternate viewpoints or influences than that of the sovereign authority. In the absence of restrictions, societies are being culturally influenced and changed by what they see on television, and consume from the movie media. In some cases this has validated our sense of belonging to political, territorially bound community but in others it has created a new awareness of the rights of individuals inducing new aspirations and expectations. Equally, the disenfranchised elements of societies often use these vehicles themselves to bring international pressures upon their own governments.⁵⁶

When those aspirations and expectations are unsatisfied or otherwise frustrated by the state, the result will be that some societies no longer find their meaning in the state. Although the Soviet Union imploded on its own economic weight, a significant impetus to the collapse was the new information available to the populous through Gorbachev's policy of perestroika. The availability of CNN has already had a tremendous impact on the availability of real time information nearly everywhere in the world. By 1997, Ted Turner

will have a direct broadcast satellite which will transmit directly from space to every corner of the globe (not even the American military has this capability). The result will be that even nations that currently shield their societies from outside cultural influence will not be able to do so. Similarly, the state's ability to engineer the information presented to its public, will be challenged by an alternate and in some cases, opposite viewpoints and media⁵⁷. It is not a large leap of logic to suggest that the information transmitted by extra-state media could undermine the credibility and power of the leadership in some states, but further, such externally generated messages to an internal audience could induce calls upon an external power to influence, pressure or intervene in the indigenous rule of law. Actions such as the US pressure on some states regarding human rights abuses, the use of such instruments as Radio Moscow and Voice of America during the Cold War, the international boycott of trade with South Africa, or the most recent UN intervention in Haiti illustrate this point.

Cultural identification with the smaller or larger community has overpowered identification within the sovereign boundaries in numerous examples of civil war or wars of expansion throughout history. Similarly, there have been historical variations of tolerance for non-state cultural identity. However, it has been more prevalent for cultural stresses to have come from within authoritarian states than in the more liberalized nations even though these stresses may not have manifested themselves until the oppressive power is reduced. This was particularly true of late nineteenth century Central European powers which suppressed minority cultural identities in the interests of projecting a homogeneous

power. Prior to this, there had been a relatively liberal view to ethnic diversity⁵⁸. Topically, the cultural identities of Balkan nationalities was suppressed or assimilated for centuries by the Austrians, Ottomans and more recently by the strong centralist power of Yugoslavian President Tito. Present day strife of that war-torn area is in large part an expression of their need for cultural identity and homogeneity.

What is equally demonstrative is the trends in some areas of the world to see a greater sense of community in religious affiliation outside sovereign borders. For example, the people of Chechnya may no longer see (or may never have seen) their ethnic, cultural, religious identities in the Russian state but see a greater alignment to their traditional Moslem or ethnic origins. In contrast to the establishment of sixteenth century moral authority in the state, induced by the Church's abuses, some societies such as the Chechens are gravitating to a moral authority outside the sovereign state because of the state's abuses and thereby challenging the common association of law and identification with the state. The same could be true of the people of Palestine, Somalian, Rwandan, Algerian or Angolan states who find their identity divorced of state boundaries. Ironically, one of the reasons for the failure of the UN or any other supranational organization in averting or mitigating the human catastrophes in Rwanda, Somalia or the Balkans is because of the moral and institutional weight accorded to the principle of national sovereignty in the UN Charter.

The sociological change to the face of sovereignty is not only found in the mirror of states's failures. The creation of larger supranational entities to satisfy the needs of peoples is also evidence of its changing nature. It could be argued that the creation of the League of Nations, or the International Court or the United Nations have been attempts at supranational organizations and that current trends are nothing new and will have little effect on the notion of sovereignty. However, NAFTA and the EU have created levels of agreement, expectation and satisfaction in entities outside singular national boundaries. The creation of the European Parliament required that the 16 European states which belong to it release some of their sovereign powers to the central body in an arrangement of "pooled sovereignty". Similarly, because of the recent degree of involvement by the UN in "peace operations", there is a new level of expectation and responsibility accorded the UN, and the world's leading hegemonic power, the US. Their presence in Haiti places a new onus on the US and other contributory nations to establish and maintain the rule of law on that island until the nation's political power can demonstrate that it can provide for the needs of the citizens. As other nations falter in the future, there will be a similar expectation and responsibility thrust upon the UN and the US. Moreover, if there is not some greater degree of burden sharing to relieve the US as the banker of last resort, it may well point to the decline of the US as a world power⁵⁹ and its replacement by another power or international body. If the creation of nation state was to establish the sovereign's rule of law, is the world society's request of the UN or the dominant hegemonic power to establish the rule of law, a harbinger of a new order? That the UN failed in Somalia and Rwanda and is as yet so ill prepared for other peace-making operations, may be demonstrative of the moral

and institutional weight of sovereignty and the fear by robust nations that such an example of outside intervention could potentially be imposed upon them. Yet had the UN been willing to establish the rule of law in these failed states until new self-determinant arrangements had been established, gross human catastrophes could have been averted.

The Capability and Nature of Change in Nations

It is oft cited that the new world order is one of constant volatility, increasing uncertainty and rapid change. This order will impose upon nations which are not structured for it, a need to adapt to these changes. This will in turn will challenge the flexibility of existing power structures and demand policy innovation to cope with them. In an insightful analysis of innovation in organizations, James Q. Wilson⁶⁰ concluded, " that the rate of proposal of innovations is directly proportional to the diversity (complexity and dispersion of power) of the organization, while the rate of adoption of innovations is inversely proportional to the diversity of the organization." This leads Huntington to the suggest that dispersed political systems have many proposals but few adoptions and political systems where power is concentrated would have few proposals but many adoptions. However, he also qualifies the adaptability to change at these two extremes from the adaptability elsewhere in the continuum and the level that the traditional social forces, interests, customs and institutions are entrenched. Furthermore, political systems differ by both the amount and dispersion of power. In systems where a small amount of power is organizationally dispersed, power can be concentrated rapidly, but in systems where a large amount of power is dispersed widely, concentrating power is more difficult. A greater

concentration of power will be required to redirect existing systems where traditional forces are strongest and where a larger amount of power is more dispersed. Huntington further suggests that the concentration, amount and dispersion of power is subject to phases of modernization (change). In the first phase, a concentration of power is required to change traditional social, economical or cultural beliefs. The social and economic change induced by the policy innovation promotes the second phase which leads new groups to demand entry into the political system and thus expands the amount of power. The third disperses that power.

What does this say about the current evolution of sovereign power? If we work the phasing backward, we can see from the foregoing analysis that power in the Third Wave, industrialized- to- post industrialized societies is being dispersed, which implies that they are well advanced in the integration of new groups into the political system (pluralistic systems manifest a high degree of integration) and that there is more collective power (as opposed to concentrated power) in the whole than in the individual parts. West European, North American societies and international bodies such as the United Nations, the World Trade Organization, NAFTA or the European Union could be characterized as pluralistic entities.

Strong nations that disperse their power both internally and externally are the nations that Applied Futures has identified as being advanced into the growth needs of Maslow's hierarchy⁶¹(see ANNEX A). It is important to acknowledge that the growth need

nations are made up of both those with predominantly Inner-directed motivation (altruistic) and Outer-directed (achievement) motivation. The populations of those nations whose motivations are predominantly Inner-directed are those who have crossed the threshold to the Third Wave and Information Age. They are more likely to see the dispersion of power as less threatening and better for the collective power and social good of the whole. As these more advanced nations have achieved the dispersion of their power over a considerable period of time, they are not as capable of rapid change and are therefore more stable. Stresses will build because this bureaucratically complex, hierarchical power of the governing bodies are not adapting to the technical, social and economic changes at the same rate as the society it serves⁶². Its society is more advanced into the Information Age and uses information/data processing technology and networked (as opposed to hierarchical) empowered management structures to cope with the social, technological and economic changes. We have seen that the trends are for this society to bypass the impeding elements of governmental power and seek satisfaction for their aspirations outside of the state structure. Metaphorically, these states or organizations are ocean liners with a great amount of mass. Numerous forces and powers are at the helm trying to influence a directional change but even a large force exerted on a small rudder must overcome the combined inertia and weight of the entire vessel, as well as contend with the differences in motivations of all the powers at the helm. As a result, those travellers who are not interested in going to the same port as the ocean liner or getting there faster, are choosing to go by air.

The states whose motivations are more Outer-directed have established themselves in the Second Wave industrialized societies with expanding power but are not yet ready or powerful enough to disperse that power. Outer-directed nations seek to expand their power to remain competitive and thus some are developed to the point where they wish to conform to the norms of the larger community predominantly for their own benefit rather than that of the whole. Others may not conform to the same degree because they do not have the same confidence in their competitive abilities and see conformity as threatening to their security and esteem needs. Because of their less complex and less pluralistic political systems, power is not dispersed as much as in the Inner-directed societies and therefore less stable and more capable of change. They have access to similar technologies, exposed to the similar social changes and are subject to the same economic forces as are the threshold Third Wave societies and thus are influenced by the same motivations for change. However, because of their less complex systems and greater concentration of power, they are more adaptable to the changes. Thus they may be able to satisfy the aspirations and needs of their societies more easily. They are the ocean-going yachts which either follow the shipping lanes because that is where they can sail the smooth wakes of the ocean liners or take their own paths to ports where liners cannot navigate. Changes in direction are easier to initiate and the reaction time is less than that of the liner with a greater flexibility to satisfy the varying desires of its passengers.

Lastly, are the states who have volatile and competing economic, social and cultural belief systems. In order to contain the divisive tendencies, power in these states tends be

concentrated but has insufficient mass to disperse that power and remain stable. They tend to be feudalistic traditional⁶³, agrarian, First Wave societies. Because power is concentrated, it is capable of more rapid innovation but has fewer innovative inputs. They tend to be one party systems. In terms of Maslow's hierarchy, they are the sustenance states who are suspicious of outside control and influence and tend to relate sovereignty with their ability to provide for the nutrition, shelter and safety and belonging needs of their population. Their desires for cultural, ethnic and/or religious homogeneity, strong internal military forces and centralized closed economies mirror the earliest developments of the nation state similar to that of seventeenth century Europe. However, they vary from the historical model in that their exposure and access to outside second and third wave information and communication technology and external social, economic and cultural influence produces a significant difference in their level of expectation. Because power in these states can be readily concentrated, rapid changes in direction are possible but the total amount of power may not be sufficient to maintain the desired direction or resist new changes in direction from competing power. Alternately, they may seek the assistance of larger powers to satisfy their needs and limit the internal control of their direction. They are the motor launches with limited power where the actions of the leader at the helm are translated immediately into the direction of the boat. They are not capable of navigating on the open seas and tend to restrict their horizons to the inshore waters unless they agree to being towed by a larger vessel, in which case they are subject to the greater vessel's direction.

CONCLUSION

As we have explored, the nature of sovereignty is being influenced by increasing economical, cultural, technical, ecological and sociological change. As the world shrinks, the end that sovereignty seeks to serve remains the welfare of its people. However, the outside opportunities for satisfaction of individual needs are much more accessible. Post-industrial, Third Wave, complex state power will continue their slow and evolutionary change and remain maternalistic, but their flexible business communities, driven by technology, communication and the global economy, will press toward individualism and change at a much faster rate. The contrast decreases the individual's identity, expectation or satisfaction within the state and he may even grow indifferent to his association with it. This demands significant change in the structure of the state to reduce its complexity and power and hence its sovereignty.

In those states at the second level of change, the industrialized and emerging Second Wave nations, there will still be a significant expectation for the state to provide for the deficiency needs of the people. The degree to which their sovereign power survives continues to be dependent upon the way it is exercised. In order to be able to adapt rapidly to these changes, power will alternately contract and expand until sufficient mass of power is accumulated to disperse it. These nations will be stressed by both external and internal challenges to their power and their ability to interface with the Third Wave powers and entities. Because of investment by TNCs and direct foreign investment of the Third Wave

nations, they will be dependent upon external sources of power and the degree to which they restrict or liberate foreign access will determine their accumulation of power. Sociological pressures will emanate from within as outside ideas and cultural norms are received through the global media and change the societal expectations. People in these nations will tend to identify the satisfaction of their needs with the sovereign power.

Sovereign power in First Wave, pre-industrialized states will be concentrated to effect the required changes perceived by its leadership. Identification of the people's meaning with the state is less of an imperative than their subsistence needs and internal allegiances will vary according to what internal power can best satisfy their basic, safety and belonging needs. The volatility of power and the risks accompanying association with varying power centers may well divorce any cultural linkage with internecine power other than coercively and temporarily. Dependent upon the accessibility of external power, these states will be either highly dependent and subject to outside political, economic and cultural influence or alternately, if restrictive to external access, will be economically destitute and subject to internal collapse. In either eventuality, people in First Wave nations will, of necessity rather than choice, be increasingly dependent upon outside power and subject to decreased sovereignty despite the ambiguity of internal power being concentrated.

The pressure on supranational organizations accommodate the interface of these three models will grow. While International Law means little to the individual in developed societies, appeals to International Law and international bodies such as the UN, as well as



to the international conscience and morality of organizations such as Amnesty International are often the only recourse by people of the Third World. The progress in universal areas of concern, such the environment, is already evident and international pressure in the area of human rights has enjoyed limited success. However, because supranational organizations such as the UN tend to be complex, where power is widely dispersed, they will be slow reacting to change and may not be able to adjust to the global societal needs. This then, may place greater responsibility on more adaptable organizations such as business entities or religious organizations to satisfy the aspirations and identity needs of the people. Alternately, there may be sufficient pressure for supranational organizations to decrease their complexity in order to adapt to the changes.

As we have determined by this discussion, the evolutionary concept of sovereignty has less to do with space and legal, moral interpretation than it has to do with social dynamics, economics, technology and culture. As the new world order introduces unprecedented changes to those dynamics, the people will vary in their expectations of the nation state to satisfy their interests and the description and the purpose of the national power will be altered. The challenge for us is to make the right alterations for the unified interests of mankind and to resist the temptations to preserve artificially, the old construct of sovereignty without remaining cognizant of the purpose that it serves.

LIST OF ATTACHMENTS

**ANNEX A MASLOW'S HIERARCHY OF NEEDS AND EUROPEAN
CULTURAL MAP**

ANNEXA



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ENDNOTES

1. Laski, Harold J. *A Grammar of Politics*, 1925 New Haven Yale University Press. p 17

2. The following are examples of text found on the America on Line, Internet news service on 17 November 1994:

a. "...countries of the UN General Assembly called for the United States to quit meddling in Cuba's domestic affairs and lift its economic embargo...while some countries criticized Cuba's human rights record(etc)... they also chastised the United States for interfering with Cuba's sovereignty"

b. (In discussions about GATT, European Parliament Press release)...The Commissioner took the view that all regions would benefit, although some more than others. On the question of a social clause he pointed out that China was now knocking on the door and wanted to join, while turning to the issue of wrangles over national sovereignty, he emphasized that the purpose of sovereignty was to enable it to be used and this case was clearly one, where even Euro-skeptics could accept, that the pooling of sovereignty could achieve more than national governments acting alone. He also took the view that the agreement itself concluded last year had inspired business confidence and led to an upturn in the economy..."

c. (Reuters article on dismissal of Argentinean Amb Campora) "...Campora criticized government proposals to pay Falklanders in return for accepting Argentine sovereignty over the South Atlantic islands, which Argentina calls the Malvinas. His remarks jarred with the four-day visit's symbols of reconciliation between Britain and Argentina, which still claims sovereignty of the islands..."

d. (Reuters article, 17 Nov 94) "...they dismissed claims by some conservative lawmakers who want to delay a vote until a new Republican-dominated Congress convenes in January and who argue that the WTO might undermine U.S. sovereignty and hurt U.S. trade interests..."

e. (Reuters article 17 Nov 94) "...Transnational criminal organizations pose serious and still not fully acknowledged threats to the dignity and safety of individuals, to the sovereignty, security and stability of states, to the proper functioning of financial and commercial institutions...and to the order and stability of the international system..."

f. (Reuter Article 17 Nov 94) "...Arafat during a Palestinian Independence Day speech in Gaza City... 'God willing, next year we will celebrate independence in Jerusalem, the capital of the Palestinian State,' Arafat told his supporters. 'The unification of Jerusalem under our sovereignty will be forever,' Rabin retorted on Wednesday..."

3. By the end of the fifteenth century there were some 500 independent political units in Europe.

4. see Harold J Laski *A Grammar of Politics*, Yale University Press, New Haven 1925. Ch 1 and 2

5. The demands for reform were ironically the result of the new knowledge for the common man brought about by the Renaissance. The Renaissance promoted education and learning and it was the new found knowledge that enticed the challenges of the Church's traditional teachings. One such precursor to the Reformation of the sixteenth century occurred in the fourteenth century when Wycliffe (1320-1384), an English priest denounced the doctrines of the Church and appealed to the free intelligence and conscience in mankind against the

traditional, ceremonial authority of the church. His writings influenced John Huss who delivered a number of lectures in Prague which the church found particularly scandalous. When he refused to recant his views, he was burnt alive in 1415. These writings may well have influenced Luther in his decision to challenge the authority of a corrupt church. (see H.G. Wells *An Outline of History* Ch 23)

6. see Toffler, Alvin and Heidi, *the Third Wave*, New York, Bantam, 1980. Their wave theory suggests that the first wave of civilization was the agricultural revolution, the second, the industrial revolution and the that we are now embarking upon the third wave of change - the information revolution. Each wave has its distinct effect on civilization, its structure, economies, social formations and politics.

7. Harold J Laski *A Grammar of Politics* 1925, New Haven Yale University Press pp45

8. For Machiavelli, the organization of the state was one that secures the persons and property and only a shrewd prince can establish the moral character of the society.

9. The thesis Bodin's *De la Republique*, first published in 1577, was that a central authority should wield unlimited power and that it needed to be given legal recognition. He uses terms such as souverainete, majestas and summa potestas interchangeably.

10. In expressing his thoughts in *The Leviathan* in 1651, Hobbes saw sovereignty as a contract in which all individuals agreed to submit to the state which effectively removed the distinction between the society and the state. For Hobbes, the only alternative to an omnipotent sovereign was anarchy as autonomous individuals would otherwise find themselves in a constant state of insecurity. Thus, complete coercive sovereignty must rest with the state for the "safety of the people". As an aside, it is interesting to note the similarity of Hobbes' interpretations of human needs and those of Maslow - "Those that are dearest to a man are his own life, and limbs; and in the next degree those that concern conjugal affection; and then the riches and means of living"

11. Locke rejected the Hobbesian view in reasserting that moral law was superior to positive law and that governments must do what is naturally and morally right. He held that the power of government was held in trust for the people and only maintained its legitimacy from their consent.

12. In his *Social Contract* published in 1762, Rousseau describes a compromise between the Hobbesian and Lockian views. While arguing like Hobbes that state sovereignty is unlimited and indivisible, he saw the community of citizens as a moral and collective personality where every individual "while uniting himself with all, may still obey himself alone, and remain as free as before". Thus while ultimate sovereignty rested with the state, it could only exist within the limits of certain moral conventions.

13. Kant, writing on the concept of constitutional government suggested that sovereignty was shared between the people and the state in that the citizen made the laws through his election of a representative and the state executed the law on his behalf through the executive and interpreted by the judiciary.

14. see Joseph A. Camilleri and Jim Falk *The End of Sovereignty?* Edgar Publishing Ltd., Brookfield Vermont, 1992. p 23

15. see Norman L Stamps, *Why Democracies Fail*, University of Notre Dame Press, Notre Dame Indiana, 1957, p 9

16. see Michael Mann, *The Rise and Decline of the Nation State*, T.J. Press Ltd, Padstow, Cornwall, UK. 1990, ch 10

17. An example of the extremes of pressure to cultural conformity is in Heinrich von Treitschke's pamphlet of 1878, *Auch ein Wort uber Judentum*, in which he demanded that the German Jews abandon their traditional faith and be baptized in order to be fully assimilated into the German national culture. Although not adopted as policy at that time, the notions expressed in the pamphlet were graphically expressed in Hitler's policies a half century later. Similar desires for cultural conformity have led to the reported "ethnic cleansing" practices in the Balkans today. (see endnote 14 ch 4).

18. This phenomenon still exists in some cultures today to which the slaughter of Tutsis in Rwanda by the majority Hutus in 1963 and 1994 attests.

19. There are some 1500 tribal groupings in Africa and the closer ties to the tribal groupings than the nation state continues to be a source of conflict in a large number of states as was recently seen in Rwanda.

20. see Joseph A Camillerin and Jim Falk *The End of Sovereignty?* Edgar Publishing Ltd Brookfield, Vermont 1992 p.12

21. see Samuel P Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Societies*, Yale University Press, New Haven and London, 1968, p 173.

22. from the *International Studies Quarterly*, June 1993,

23. see Morgenthau, *Politics Amongst Nations*, Knopf Inc, New York 1948 p499

24. see end note 1.b

25. see Morgenthau, *Politics Amongst Nations*, ibid Ch 19

26. see Huntington, Samuel, *Political Order in Changing Societies*, Yale University Press, New Haven and London, 1968. Ch 5.

27. again, Morgenthau would argue that the exertion of external influence or control does not mean that a nation surrenders its sovereignty. If it allows itself to be subject to these controls then its sovereignty or supreme power is not in question because the state still has the legal power to make laws. This, however requires that one accepts his view that sovereignty must be absolute and indivisible.

28. see David Harvey, *The Condition of Post Modernity, an Inquiry into the Origins of Cultural Change*, Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1989, p 44

29. see Peter Paret, *Makers of Modern Strategy*, Princeton University Press, Princeton N.J. 1986 and the article by Edward Mead Earle, "Adam Smith, Alexander Hamilton, Frederick List:" *The Economic Foundations of Military Power*".

30. Morgenthau correctly observes that industrial capacity is one of the major influences to military capability and advocates the intervention of the state to ensure the maintenance of the industrial base. Realists will also point out that it was the abundance of wealth and the superior industrial base of the US

that defeated the Soviet Union in the Cold War because the Soviet Union could not match America's economic superiority. See Hans Morgenthau, *Politics Amongst Nations*, Knopf, New York, 1968, p 113.

31. Ethan Kapstein, *The Political Economy of National Security*, McGraw Hill, New York, 1992. p 5

32. see Ernest Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism*, Cornell University Press, London, 1983, p 55. Gellner argues that in hegemonical states, minor local cultures conform to that of the dominant culture if there is sufficient economic and political advantage.

33. see Abraham H. Maslow, *Motivation and Personality*, Harper & Row Publishers, New York, Evanston and London, 1954. ch 4.

34. taken from a paper by Christine A Ralph MacNulty, *Social Change: the often ignored Driving Force*, in her Applied Futures lecture series to the Industrial College of the Armed Forces January 1995

35. Trade, as a percentage of USA's GNP, grew from 4% in the 1930's to 12% by 1984. By 1993, US exports of goods and services represented 11.6% of GDP and imports 13.2%. From *The Economic Report of the President 1994*.

36. In 1980 US based TNCs were responsible for 80% of its exports and 30% of its imports.

37. Madeuf and Michalet, *International Social Science Journal*, 1978 in their article entitled "A New Approach to International Economics".

38. from *The Economic Report of the President 1994*. table 6-3.

39. in 1967, the estimated book value of all foreign investment was \$110B.

40. Between 1973 and 1980, some two thousand US firms were taken over by Canadian, European and Japanese transnationals.

41. National Academy on Engineering, *National Interests in an Age of Global Technology*, National Academy Press, Washington, 1991, p1

42. see Alexander J. Groth, *Major Ideologies: An Interpretive Survey of Democracy, Socialism and Nationalism*, John Wiley and Sons, New York, London, Sydney and Toronto, 1971. Ch 10, 11.

43. In December 1994, the dollar could buy three pesos; by the end of January 1995, it could buy six.

44. taken from an television interview on the program *48 Hours*.

45. see Washington Post, *Mexican Financial Markets, Politicians Cheered by Clinton Initiative*, Ted Robinson, 1 February 1995. p A6

46. see Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Societies*, Yale University Press, New Haven and London, 1968. p 333,334. It is contended by Huntington that the external political and economic influence and support of the US destabilized and polarized the Bolivian political process.

47. see Waltz Kenneth N., *International Anarchy - A Realist Perspective in Theories of International Relations* National Defense University, Washington DC 1990 p 163.

48. see Manuel Guitan, *Fund Conditionality*, IMF Pamphlet Series No 38, Washington 1981.

49. see Keohane Robert O. and Nye Joseph S. *An Interdependent World in Theories in International Relations*, National Defense University, Washington DC. 1990 p. 231.

50. see Jensen, Lloyd *Economics as a Determinant of State Action*, in *Theories of International Relations*, National Defense University, Washington DC 1990, p. 110,111

51. *ibid* for example, "the United States sought to stop subsidiaries in Canada from selling flour to Cuba, drugs to Vietnam and trucks to China. (The Canadian government was often able to counter these pressures by using other firms in such transactions)".

52. see John H Herz, *International Politics in the Nuclear Age*, New York, Columbia University Press, 1959 p 169

53. see phase paper, Michael Wansink, *The Baggage of Alliances*, Industrial College of the Armed Forces, Washington, Nov 1994

54. In authoritarian states such as Nazi Germany, or the Soviet Union there were state bureaucracies designed to control (and distort) the information available to the public. Even in societies with a free press, cultural or political biases and influence of the medium shape the information provided.

55. For example the following is an excerpt off the America On Line INTERNET news service:" TORONTO, Dec 22 (94)(Reuter) - In a trade flare-up between the United States and Canada, Ottawa announced plans on Thursday to slap a surtax on the Canadian edition of Sports Illustrated magazine to protect its national cultural identity.

The United States immediately threatened to retaliate against the "unacceptable" action by Canada. U.S. Trade Representative Mickey Kantor said Canada's decision to reform tax and copyright laws amounted to discrimination against U.S. interests..."

56. The world focus on Tianmen Square on prime time TV , movies such as *The Killing Fields*, or *Salvador* have a powerful impact on the world community. The catalyst to the UN's taking on the Somali relief operation is largely attributed to the coverage of the famine and internecine war by CNN. Similarly and more topically, the Tod Robberson article in The Washington Post on 20 February 1995, entitled *Mexican Rebels Using High Tech Weapon, Internet Helps Rally Support*, underlines the newest and most accessible media tool available to spread political cultural messages on bulletin boards like Peacenet, Chiapas List, and Mexpax.

57. see endnote 54.

58. For example, when Poland was divided between the Habsburg, Prussian and Russian empires in 1797, the Polish nation was accorded cultural autonomy across territorial national borders but this was reversed by 1860 as Russia and Prussia had developed more authoritarian regimes.

59. see David P Callen, *The US in the 1960s: Hegemon in Decline?* in the publication, *The Rise and Decline of the Nation State* edited by Michael Mann, T. J. Press Ltd, Padstow, Cornwall 1990. p 146, 147. The author borrows largely from observations by Paul Kennedy (*The Rise and Fall of Great Powers*) and Charles P Kindleberger, (*The World in Depression*). in the suggestion that the US may well be extended beyond its means in providing for the economic and security needs of the " free-riders" of the world which will lead eventually to challenges to its preeminence.

60. cited in Huntington's *Political Order in Changing Societies*, from James Q Wilson, *Innovation in Organization: notes toward Theory*, in James D Thompson, ed *Approaches to Organizational Design*, Pittsburgh, University of Pittsburgh Press, 1966. See Huntington's Ch 3.

61. see endnote 32 and 33.

62. see Jacques S Gansler, *Affording Defense*, MIT Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, London England, 1991. p. 107-121. Although this book deals with only defense acquisition in the USA, Mr Gansler provides a description of the effect of government oversight and intervention as being "devastating" His analysis is illustrative of the overwhelming complexity of the governmental process, legislation and inputs of special interest groups.

63. ibid endnote 58, p 146